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NOTES
Attorneys: Vicarious Disqualification and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct
In today's mobile society, people often move from one place of work to
another. This is true of all occupations, but it creates particular problems for
attorneys. Because of the nature of their work, attorneys are exposed to
clients' confidential information. This exposure results in "imputed dis-
qualification" problems for both individual attorneys and law firms.
The doctrine of imputed disqualification grants the courts the power to
disqualify a whole law firm where a single member of the firm would be dis-
qualified for a conflict of interest.' The doctrine recognizes that lawyers form
law firms in order to combine their skill and expertise. As a result of this
pooling of skills, client confidences within the knowledge of one attorney are
often revealed to another. The exposure may be inadvertent; nevertheless,
when an attorney leaves one law firm to join another, he takes with him all
client confidences disclosed to him in his prior employment. By joining a law
firm that represents an interest adverse to any of the attorney's previous
clients, the potential exists for the attorney to use the confidences of a former
client against that client.
The "infected" attorney cannot always cure the problem by allowing a
coworker to handle the project. 2 Confidences can be used just as easily by an
informed coworker as by the original recipient of the information. The doc-
trine of imputed disqualification is designed to prevent this potential misuse
of information.
This note analyzes the law concerning imputed disqualification as it has
developed to its present-day form. The following situation is examined. A is
an attorney for law firm #1. During his employment, A is the primary con-
tact for client X. A leaves law firm #1 and goes to work for law firm #2. Law
firm #2 represents client Y, the opposing party to X. First, the note focuses
on the problem of successive representation as a basis for primary dis-
qualification. Second, the development of the imputed disqualification doc-
1. Note, An Equitable Alternative to the Discriminatory Imposition of Vicarious Firm Dis-
qualification, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1031 (1985). The doctrine is also known as the "vicarious dis-
qualification doctrine." The term "vicarious" is used because the disqualification arises from
the conduct of the individual attorney and not that of the entire law firm. The term "imputed"
is used by the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
2. See generally LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 258 (7th Cir. 1983)
(attorneys that possess previous client confidences that may be used against the same client who
revealed the information referred to as "Typhoid Marys"). The court stated that an entire law
firm may be disqualified as a result of "infection." Id.
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trine is examined as it has changed from the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility to the Model Rules. Third, the "Chinese Wall" or screening defense
is discussed as a method of avoiding an imputed disqualification.3 Fourth,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are examined. Because Oklahoma
has little case law in this area,4 a Delaware case will be considered for its per-
suasive value.' The case involves a fact pattern similar to the hypothetical
situation presented above and interprets rules identical to the Oklahoma
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Oklahoma Bar Association has
accepted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; however, the rules are
not binding until they are adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Finally,
the note suggests possible solutions to the problems presented by the doctrine
of imputed disqualification.
Imputed disqualification is a two-step process involving both primary and
secondary disqualifications. The primary disqualification occurs when an in-
dividual member of a law firm is disqualified or required to withdraw from
representation because of a conflict of interest. The primary disqualification
typically result,; in the secondary disqualification, that is, the disqualification
of the entire law firm.'
In determining whether to disqualify an attorney or a law firm, the courts
have looked to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility for guidance.
7
Although the Code has been used as a guide to determine whether a dis-
qualification motion should be allowed, it has some significant problems.
First, the ABA. overlooked the problems associated with successive represen-
tation. A successive representation conflict of interest occurs when an at-
torney represents a client whose interest is adverse to a previous client. Sec-
ond, although the imputed disqualification rule, DR 5-105(D), was initially
drafted too narrowly,8 a 1974 amendment resulted in an overly broad rule.9
Finally, the rules appear to ignore the inequities that result from their imple-
mentation.
In an attempt to resolve some of the problems associated with the Code,
the ABA presented the legal community with the Model Rules of Profes-
3. The term "Chinese Wall" refers to any set of physical and procedural barriers intended
to prevent one member of an organization from being exposed to information relating to a mat-
ter currently or formerly handled by one of his colleagues. Amoco Chem. v. MacArthur, 568 F.
Supp. 42, 47 n.9 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
4. Northeastern Okla. Community Dev. Corp. v. Adams, 510 P.2d 939 (Okla. 1973).
5. Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418, 425 (D. Del. 1986).
6. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.6, at 393 (1986).
7. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY Preamble (1980). (The Model Code is
presented by the American Bar Association as a guide to practicing attorneys). The Model Code,
however, has no binding effect unless adopted by a state legislature and/or a state court. See
Ruder, Disqualification of Counsel: Disclosure of Client Confidences, Conflicts of Interest, and
Prior Governmeni Services, 35 Bus. LAW. 963, 964 n.7 (1980). Oklahoma has adopted its own
version of the Model Code. See 5 OKLA. STAT. ch. 1, app. 3 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
8. The rule was limited to disqualifications arising "under DR 5-105" only (emphasis
added). MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1980).




sional Conduct.'" The House of Delegates for the Oklahoma Bar Association
adopted its own version of the rules at the November 1986 bar convention."
The Primary Disqualification
The actual disqualification of an individual attorney must occur before an
imputed disqualification occurs.' 2 The Code provides no guidance to at-
torneys facing the problem of successive representation. As a result, most
courts have adopted the "substantial relationship" test to determine if suc-
cessive representation conflicts of interest exist. 3
The Judicially Created Substantial Relationship Test
The substantial relationship test was first used in the case of T. C. Theater
Corp. v. Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. '4 In this case, the court held that
"where any substantial relationship can be shown between the subject matter
of the former representation and that of a subsequent adverse representation,
the latter will be prohibited."'" Once such a relationship is shown, the court
will presume that client confidences were divulged to the attorney during the
former representation.' 6
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp.," the Seventh Circuit
modified this test to provide guidelines to determine what constitutes a
"substantial relationship." A judge must make a three-level inquiry to deter-
mine if such a relationship exists. The judge must (1) reconstruct the scope of
the prior legal representation; (2) determine whether a reasonable inference
can be made that the confidential information allegedly given would have
been given to a lawyer representing a client in those matters; and (3) deter-
mine whether the information is relevant to the issues raised in the litigation
pending against the former client.' 8
Once the substantial relationship is proved, a presumption arises that the
attorney has been exposed to the client confidences and should be dis-
qualified. Some courts hold that this presumption is irrebuttable.' 9 This rule
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
11. Proposed Oklahoma Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 57 OKLA. B.J. 1997 (Sept. 6,
1986).
12. See infra note 30.
13. E.g., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 774
F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1985); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980); Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); Simmon's, Inc. v.
Pinkerton's, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
14. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
15. Id. at 268.
16. Id.
17. 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).
18. Id. at 225.
19. Analytical, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1268 (7th Cir. 1983); Duncan v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Yarn
Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976); Hughs v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 663, 669 (N.D. I1. 1983).
1987]
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is consistent with the language of T. C. Theater, which states that the court
may not inquire into the nature and extent of the disclosure.20 Other courts,
however, have modified the test to allow the presumption to be rebutted if
"there was no realistic chance" that the former client confidences were
disclosed."'
Model Rule 1.9"s Codification of Substantial Relationship Test
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, unlike the Model Code, have a
provision specifically designed to address the successive representation pro-
blem. 22 Rule 1.9 adopts the substantial relationship test and, thus, reflects the
majority view. 23 Rule 1.9 also incorporates rule 1.6.24 This allows an attorney
to use confidential information given by a former client if such use is in ac-
cord with rule 1.6;25 that is, the former client must consent to the attorney's
representation of an adverse client.26 This waiver provision is consistent with
DR 5-105(C', which states that "a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it
is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each
consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of
such representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment
on behalf of each.
' 27
20. 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Accord, Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc.,
708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983); Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1977);
Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1976).
21. Cheng ,. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 903 (1981);
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975) Ac-
cord, LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 256 (7th Cir. 1983); Freeman v.
Chicago Musical Instr. Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982); Simmon's, Inc. v. Pinkerton's,
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (The author of this note calls to attention that both
LaSalle and Freeman cite incorrectly Novo Terapeutisk, Etc. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d
186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979). In that case, the court allowed a presumption to be rebutted that an at-
torney shared contidences of a former client with his new firm. Both LaSalle and Freeman cite
the case for the proposition that the individual attorney can rebut the presumption that con-
fidential information was received by the attorney while employed with the previous firm).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983).
23. See cases cited supra note 13.
24. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983) provides:
CONFLICT OF INTEREST: FORMER CLIENT
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the
information has become generally known.
25. Id. Rule 1.6(a) provides in part: "(a) a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation."
26. "Disqualification from subsequent representation is for the protection of clients and can
be waived by them. A waiver is effective only if there is disclosure of the circumstances, in-
cluding the lawyer's intended role in behalf of the new client." Id. Rule 1.9 comment 4.




Rule 1.9 codifies the previous judicial tests. However, when determining
whether a substantial relationship exists, one must keep in mind the question
of "whether the lawyer was so involved in the [previous] matter that the
subsequent representation can be justly regarded as changing sides in the
matter. ' 28 The rule provides stability by emphasizing the concept of loyalty.
The Secondary Disqualification
Once an attorney is disqualified as a result of a conflict of interest, the en-
tire law firm29 where the individual is employed may also be disqualified
under DR 5-105(D).30
28. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment 12] (1983) provides:
The scope of a "matter" for purposes of Rule 1.9(a) may depend on the facts of a
particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also
be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific
transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse in-
terests clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a
type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing
another client in a wholly distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent
representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considera-
tions can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and pro-
secution functions within the same military jurisdiction. The underlying question is
whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representa-
tion can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question.
29. Lawyers who participate in office-sharing arrangements may be treated as partners under
the imputed disqualification rule. In re Opinion No. 415, 81 N.J. 318, 407 A.2d 1197 (1979). But
see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1486 (1982) (lawyers
with conflicting interests may share office space if reasonable care is taken to protect confidential
information, and all affected clients consent).
30. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980) provides:
Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another Client
May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his indepen-
dent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under
DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his in-
dependent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under
DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each
and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect
of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on
behalf of each.
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employ-
ment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer af-
filiated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employment.
1987]
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Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The American Bar Association first implemented the rule of imputed dis-
qualification in 1969.3 As a result of poor drafting, the rule was limited to
only disqualifications arising "under DR 5-105." 32 DR 5-105 directs an at-
torney to decline employment or to discontinue multiple employment where
the "exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another."
Other conflicts, such as successive representation problems, were not
covered. In 1974 the ABA added an amendment that made the rule overly
broad. As amended, the rule states: "If a lawyer is required to decline
employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no
partner, or associate or any other lawyer associated with him or his firm may
accept or continue such employment.
' 33
The language of DR 5-105(D) mandates a disqualification, but the courts
are reluctant to apply the rule in this manner. Imputed disqualification is
viewed as a harsh measure to be implemented only as a last resort.3 4 The view
results from the inequities that occur when an imputed disqualification takes
place. The party that wins a disqualification motion gains an extreme tactical
advantage. The client whose lawyer is disqualified is denied the counsel of
choice and risks the loss of the attorney's work product. The client also is
significantly delayed while searching for replacement counsel and waiting for
new counsel to become familiar with the case. After an imputed disqualifica-
tion has occurred, a client may be forced to settle because of a lack of
resources. As a result, the imputed disqualification rules are subject to
manipulation in order to obtain a tactical advantage.3
The imputed disqualification rule, DR 5-105(D), gives rise to a presump-
tion that ar attorney who has been exposed to a former client's confidences
has shared them with his present associates. Some courts have held this
31. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (Final Draft. Aug. 12,
1969). The Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the Code on Dec. 12, 1969. The Code became ef-
fective Jan. 1. 1970.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY amend. 246 (1979) (emphasis added). The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has not adopted this amendment. However, when interpreting the
statute, the courts have kept in mind that the purpose of the amendment was to bring all conflict
of interest disquaifications under the imputed disqualification rule.
34. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instr. Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982); Kesselhaut v.
United States, 555 F.2d 791, 794 (Ct. CI. 1977) (en banc).
35. One extreme of manipulation of the vicarious disqualification doctrine is for a shrewd
client to disclose his particular case to an attorney of every major law firm in town before
deciding which firm to retain. After doing so, the client chooses one firm to undertake his
representation. Once the client enters into a retainer agreement with one firm, the other law
firms to whom the client exposed his case may be subject to a vicarious disqualification motion
if they attempt to represent the opposition because of the confidential nature of the prior
disclosures. Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification. 1982 AM. B.




presumption to be irrebuttable. 36 This interpretation is consistent with the per
se language of the statute. However, in an effort to avoid the harsh results of
DR 5-105(D), other courts have held that this presumption is rebuttable."
Throughout this note references are made to irrebuttable and rebuttable
presumptions. These presumptions may be present in both primary and
secondary disqualifications. In the primary disqualification, the presumption
is that the individual attorney has been exposed to confidences of the client.
In the secondary disqualification, the presumption is that the attorney who
has been exposed to the confidences of the client shared the information with
his new law firm. One should take care not to confuse these secondary
presumptions with primary presumptions.
When a court decides whether a presumption has been rebutted, it must
consider evidence in light of two objectives. First, the court must balance the
interest in protecting client confidentiality and loyalty against the interest in
providing free access to lawyers. Second, the rebuttal attempt should not
force either party to divulge confidential information.3
The rebuttable presumption has been explored most frequently by the
Seventh and Second circuits. The Seventh Circuit, in Freeman v. Chicago
Musical Instrument Co.,39 held that the challenged firm had to rebut the
presumption by "clear and effective" proof."° The court held that to resolve
the issue there must be an evidentiary hearing where the court may rely "on
any of a number of factors, among them being the size of the law firm, the
area of specialization of the attorney, the attorney's position in the firm, and
the demeanor and credibility of witnesses."' The burden rests upon the at-
tacked firm to produce the evidence that is sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion.4 2 Any doubts as to the existence of an asserted conflict must be resolved
in favor of disqualification. 3
Scope of Imputed Disqualification Under Model Rule 1.10
Rule 1.10 provides a stable approach to resolve questions of imputed dis-
qualification.4 4 The first paragraph of rule 1.10 prohibits a lawyer who is
36. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978); Emle
Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
37. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instr. Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982); Cheng v.
GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 903 (1981).
38. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 6, § 7.6, at 399.
39. 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982).
40. Id. at 723.
41. Id.
42. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983).
43. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1978).
44. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983) provides:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly repre-
sent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from do-
ing so under the provisions regarding conflicts of interests stated in Rules 1.7,
1.8(c), 1.9, and 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly
1987]
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associated with a firm from representing a client if any other lawyer in the
firm is ineligible as a result of rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2."' Rule 1.7 deals
with a present-client conflict of interest.46 Rule 1.9 prohibits a lawyer from
representing an interest adverse to that of a former client.4 7 Rule 2.2 prevents
a lawyer from representing one client against another when that lawyer had
served both clients as an intermediary.' 8 The result is that rule 1.10 sets out
the conflict of interest problems that may be used as a basis for an imputed
disqualification. The scope of the imputed disqualification rule is substan-
tially changed from the narrow construction of the 1969 Code as well as the
overly broad construction of the 1974 amendment.' 9
The second paragraph provides that a law firm may not represent a client
where a newly associated attorney would be prohibited from doing so. This
paragraph is applicable to a conflict that results from a successive representa-
tion. 0
Paragraph 1.10(c) provides that the law firm may undertake the represent-
ation of a new client, who would be rejected earlier, if the infected attorney
has terminated employment with the firm." The representation may not be
undertaken, however, if: (1) the matter is "substantially related" to a matter
in which the formerly associated lawyer previously represented a client and
(2) the confidential information has been revealed to any attorney remaining
with the firm. 2 This provision prevents a law firm that has received the con-
fidential representation from defeating an imputed disqualification motion
simply by firing the infected attorney. However, the rule could adversely af-
fect the ethical attorney who has not disclosed the information. When faced
represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
lawyer, or a firm with which that lawyer was associated, had previously
represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about
whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that
is material to the matter.
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not pro-
hibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to
those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly
associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected
client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
Oklahoma's Rule is identical with one exception. Paragraph (a) does not limit rule 1.8 to
paragraph (c). Proposed Oklahoma Rule Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 57 OKLA. B.J.
1997, 2018 (Sept. 6, 1986).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.10(a) (1983).
46. Id. Ru.e 1.7.
47. Id. Rule 1.9.
48. Id. Rule 2.2.
49. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(b) (1983).




with the possibility of losing a major client, the law firm may simply fire the
ethical attorney and avoid the disqualification. The last paragraph allows the
former client to waive the opportunity to make a disqualification motion.
This is consistent with rule 1.9 as well as the former provision of DR
5-105(C)."
Rule 1.10 is not as strict as DR 5-105(D). The corresponding comment ad-
vocates a functional analysis rather than a strict application.54 The comment
states that the disqualification inquiry must be made in light of two con-
siderations: preservation of client confidentiality and avoidance of positions
adverse to the client." Also, the court is given factors to consider when
deciding a motion for an imputed disqualification. First, the former client
must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty is not compromised.
Clients should not feel that an attorney once trusted is no longer trustworthy.
Second, the rule should not be interpreted so broadly as to deny persons
from having reasonable choice of counsel. Finally, the rule should not
unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations or taking on
new clients. 6
The comments do not go so far as to suggest that invocation of the rule
creates a rebuttable presumption.5 ' In the interim between the proposed ver-
sion and the final draft, the confidentiality comment was altered signifi-
cantly.518 The proposed comment gave factors for the court to use to decide if
53. See supra note 28.
54. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment [10] (1983) (Lawyers Mov-
ing Between Firms) provides: "[10] A rule based on a functional analysis is more appropriate for
determining the question of vicarious disqualification. Two functions are involved: preserving
confidentiality and avoiding positions adverse to a client."
55. Id.
56. Id. at comment [7] provides:
[7] When lawyers have been associated in a firm but then end their association,
however, the problem is more complicated. The fiction that the law firm is the
same as a single lawyer is no longer wholly realistic. There are several competing
considerations. First, the client previously represented must be reasonably assured
that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule of
disqualification should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from
having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule of disqualification
should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and tak-
ing on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it
should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many to some
degree limit their practices to one field or another, and that many move from one
association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputed dis-
qualification were defined with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical cur-
tailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to
another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.
57. See cases cited supra note 37.
58. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comments [1l]-[14] (1983). This
draft represents a combination of the proposed comment and the final version. Portions deleted
are represented here by being struck out. Portions added are underlined.
Confidentiality
[11f Preserving confidentiality is a question of access to information. Access to
1987]
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an imputed. disqualification was appropriate, while the final version has
deleted these factors entirely." Arguably, deletion of the factors from the
final version indicates that the ABA does not favor a rebuttable presump-
tion. However, the comment also indicates that a mandatory disqualification
is not the answer to every case. Instead, the comment recommends an ad hoc
determination in each case.
The "Chinese Wall" Defense
The law firm opposing disqualification may try isolating the infected at-
torney from the remainder of the firm. This defense has been referred to as
the "Chinese Wall,"16 0 the "cone of silence,"
'"6 or "screening.1 6 2
Screening of Government Attorneys: Formal Opinion 342
In 1975 the ABA published Formal Opinion 342 in apparent response to
the amendment of DR 5-105(D). 63 This opinion advocated screening as a
information, in turn, is essentially a question of fact in particular circumstances,
aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be
made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general
access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discus-
sions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all
information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have ac-
cess to th. files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussion of
the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it
should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the
clients act:ually served but not those of other clients.
Relovait--f-act-or-in--determining--th&-tiketihood-of-a-t ual-acss-.of-4n fo at
relai-ng-to-r e-presentationi-of-a-etien-4neudethe-pr-ofessional- xperie e o-the~wyo
in-quv;ti ;thdvision-fatua-r-espor-bilty-feIhiatr-tirvever h-ofa-
natufe--and---obabte-ofec4efs-o-screening-measures.
[12] Application of thi&--iule--eai,--therefe-paragraphs (b) and (c) depends
on a situation's particular facts. In any such inquiry, the burden of proof should
rest upon the lawyeF firm whose disqualification is sought.
[13] Paragraphs (b) and (c) operate to disqualify the firm only when the lawyer
involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rule 1.6 and 1.9(b).
Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge of information relating
to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither
client in the same or a related matter even though the interest of the two clients
conflict.
[141 Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing
proessional association has a continuing duty to preserve co-nidentiality of infor-
mation about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 3.
61. Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418, 425 (D. Del. 1986).
62. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983).
63. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975)





defense to an imputed disqualification motion. The ABA's concern was that
the amended version of DR 5-105(D) would cause problems for the govern-
ment in hiring attorneys. DR 5-105(D) would limit the mobility of attorneys
leaving government employment to work in private practice. The concern
was that the government would not be able to recruit talented attorneys if
those attorneys would later have limited employment opportunities in private
practice.6" To combat the problem, the ABA concluded that screening pro-
cedures would keep the former government attorney from sharing con-
fidences with his new associates. 65 The screening arrangement, however, must
be approved by the attorney's former government agency.
66
The theory of Formal Opinion 342 was adopted by the Court of Claims in
Kesselhaut v. United States.67 The Kesselhaut law firm had represented the
Federal Housing Administration. The law firm was suing to recover fees as a
result of this representation. Kesselhaut hired the firm of Krooth and Altman
as counsel. One of the attorneys who worked at the Krooth firm had been
general counsel of the FHA while the agency had been Kesselhaut's client. As
a result, the attorney was disqualified from representing Kesselhaut in the ac-
tion. The trial judge applied the amended DR 5-105(D) and disqualified the
whole firm.6"
The Court of Claims took note of the fact that the firm had erected a
screen and found that the attorney in question had been effectively isolated
from the case. 69 The court relied on the reasoning of Formal Opinion 342,
and with the isolation procedures in mind, found that the entire law firm
should not have been disqualified. 6 The court, however, went beyond the
formal opinion in that it allowed the screen to rebut the presumption despite
the government's opposition. Formal Opinion 342 indicated that "[the
screening procedure must be implemented] to the satisfaction of the govern-
ment agency concerned."'"
The Kesselhaut decision has been cited with approval in several cases.
72
Screening seemed to be an answer to the problem the government was facing
64. "[T]he ability of government to recruit young professionals and competent lawyers
should not be interfered with by imposition of harsh restraints upon future practice nor should
too great a sacrifice be demanded of the lawyers willing to enter government service." ABA For-
mal Op. 342, supra note 63, at 518.
65. Id. at 521.
66. See infra text accompanying note 71.
67. 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en banc).
68. Id. at 792.
69. The attorney "is to continue to have no connection with the case, all other attorneys are
not allowed to discuss it with him and are to prevent any case documents from reaching him; the
files are to be kept in a locked file cabinet, the keys controlled by Mesrs. Altman and Krug and
issued to other attorneys, clerks, and secretaries, only on a 'need to know' basis." Id. at 793.
70. Id.
71. ABA Formal Op. 342, supra note 63.
72. Armstrong v. McAlphin, 461 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.
1979), en banc granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241
(2d Cir. 1979); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co. 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
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as a result of DR 5-105(D). The interest of the government in acquiring
talented legal counsel seemed to outweigh the problems involved with suc-
cessive representation. The former government attorney cases were im-
plemented as an exception to the imputed disqualification rule stated in DR
5-105(D).73 However, in subsequent decisions, the courts began to lose sight
of the context in which the rule was to be applied. Arguments began to arise
that allowing screening to be used as a defense by government attorneys and
not by private attorneys was both illogical and unjust.7" The hardship im-
posed on the client and the private attorney seemed to justify screening.
Screening cf Private Attorneys
The Seventh Circuit was the first to allow the use of a screening device to
rebut the presumption of imputed confidences within the realm of private
practice." Following the decision of Kesselhaut, the Seventh Circuit
delineated several elements to be considered in order to determine if a screen
is effective. 76 These elements are (1) the size and structure of the law firm, (2)
the existence of intrafirm safeguards or rules that ensure the infected at-
torney is denied access to relevant files or other case information, (3) the
degree of contact between the infected attorney and the attorneys handling
the case, and (4) the assurance that the infected attorney will receive no part
of the legal fees derived from the case.77 Although these measures attempt to
provide a practical framework, their effectiveness is questionable. Even if
screening procedures are in place, they will not work unless the attorney who
has the information does not reveal it and/or the attorney who will benefit
from the information does not seek it. The danger lies in the reality that these
are the only two persons who need know about a breach in the screening pro-
cedures."
The Tenth Circuit discussed imputed disqualification and screening in
Smith v. Whatcott."1 The plaintiff, Leon Smith, moved to disqualify the
defendant's counsel because the attorney who had previously represented him
in a related matter was subsequently employed by the defendant's firm. First,
73. Amoco Chem. Corp. v. MacArthur, 568 F. Supp 42, 47 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (screening Is an
unavailable remedy unless the individually disqualified attorney is a former government
employee).
74. Note, supra note 1, at 1048.
75. See Schie.sle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of
Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983). Accord, Panduit Corp. v. All States Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d
1564, 1581 (7th Cir. 1984) (dicta).
76. "A screen must be in place before a conflict arises. If a screen is put into place after a
conflict is realized, client confidences of the primarily disqualified attorney are imputed to the
remainder of the firm. Cf. LaSalle Natl Bank, 703 F.2d at 259 n.3 (screen must be timely).
77. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421 (citing LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 703 F.2d at 259).
78. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 81 (1978). '[Wlalling off' is thus like the
New England practice of bundling, having neither the credibility of real prophylaxis nor the
dignity of self control." These types of walls also bring to mind the tents used at summer camp
to segregate the sexes. The dividing line only worked when both parties wanted it to. Id.




the court applied the substantial relationship test80 and concluded that the
former representation was "similar and related" to the present one.8 ' Smith's
former attorney was irrebuttably presumed 82 to have been privileged with
confidences that required disqualification.1
3
To determine whether the confidences should be imputed to the attorney's
law firm, the court reviewed the history of screening and concluded that
screening was an effective mechanism to prevent a law firm from being dis-
qualified as a result of employing a former government attorney.8" The
history of the test was traced as it was implemented to the realm of private
practice.85 However, the court announced that "[w]e need not decide whether
to adopt this [screening] exception in an appropriate case. The factors listed
[that constitute an effective screen] . . . are not present here." 86
Although the Tenth Circuit took special care to announce that screening
was neither rejected nor accepted, the foundation was laid for eventual ac-
ceptance. The court's consideration of screening procedures represented im-
plicit approval of the rebuttable presumption standard." Thus, when the case
came back to the same court on a different issue,88 Judge Seymour stated:
"The disqualification there [Smith I] was based on a presumed firm-wide
disclosure of confidential information substantially related to the present ap-
peal in the absence of effective screening procedures at Neilson and
Senior." 9
The disciplinary rules do not make reference to the screening defense. The
judiciary, however, has treated Formal Opinion 342 as a de facto amendment
to the Code. Although the opinion expressly applied only to the former
government attorneys, 9 the concept has been extended to private practi-
tioners. 9' Through the comments to rule 1.10, the ABA has indicated that
screening does not have a place in private practice.
The Model Rules and Screening
The comments to rule 1.10 indicate that the scope of the rule should be
limited. 92 The original comment to rule 1.10 stated in part, "[r]elevant fac-
80. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
81. Smith, 757-F.2d at 1100.
82. See cases cited supra note 19.
83. Smith, 757 F.2d at 1100.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v.
County of Lake, 703 F.2d 253, 259 (7th Cir. 1983)).
86. Id.
87. See cases cited supra note 37.
88. Smith, 774 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1985) (court considered whether confidences imputed
from the attorney to the law firm should be imputed from the law firm to subsequent co-
counsel).
89. Id. at 1033. (emphasis added).
90. See supra note 69.
91. Id.
92. See supra note 58.
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tors [to be used] in determining the likelihood of actual access to information
relating to representation of a client include . . . nature and probable effec-
tiveness of screening procedures."' 93 In the final version, however, these fac-
tors were deleted.
In the final version, the comment explains why government and private at-
torneys are treated differently in the context of rules 1.10 and 1.11.94 If the
extensive disqualification of rule 1.10 were applied to former government
lawyers, the potential effect would be unduly burdensome on the govern-
ment. The government would be seriously impaired in its ability to recruit
lawyers. With these two changes to the comments, the ABA has indicated
that screening is not proper in private practice."
Application of Rule 1.10
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are not binding until they are
adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. If and when the rules are
adopted, how will the court interpret them? There is no Oklahoma law on
the subject. However, the state of Delaware has adopted the Model Rules of
Professional. Conduct and those rules were interpreted in Nemours Founda-
tion v. Gilbane, Aetna, Federal Insurance Co.96 In Nemours, the plaintiff
moved to disqualify the defendant's law firm. Bradley, an associate who had
previously worked for the plaintiff's law firm, was subsequently employed by
the defendant's law firm. This was the basis for the plaintiff's motion to dis-
qualify defendant's counsel. The attorney who had caused the conflict de-
cided not to discuss the case in any way with anyone at the law firm as soon
as he discovered the conflict of interest. 97
The court addressed a number of critical areas. At the outset it was de-
cided that under rule 1.9, Bradley could not represent a client whose interests
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.10 comments [4]-[51 (1983) (Definition
of Firm) provides:
[4] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the govern-
ment, the situation is governed by Rule 1.1 (a) and (b); where a lawyer represents
the government after having served private clients, the situation is governed by
Rule 1.I1 (c)(1). The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, in-
cluding Rules 1.6, 1.7, and 1.9.
[5] Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one
private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and
the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences,
and therefore to the protections provided in Rules 1.6, 1.9, and 1.11. However, if
the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10 were applied to former govern-
ment lawyers, the potential effect on the government would be unduly burden-
some. The government deals with all private citizens and organizations, and thus
has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than does any private law firm. In
these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously
impaired if Rule 1.10 were applied to the government. On balance, therefore, the
government is better served in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1.11.
95. Id.
96. 632 F. Supp 418 (D. Del. 1986).




were "materially adverse" to the interests of a former client. 98 Several re-
quirements must have been present in order to satisfy the requirements of
rule 1.9. First, an attorney-client relationship must have existed with a
former client. Second, the present client's matter must be the same matter the
attorney had worked on for a previous client or be "substantially related"
to the previous matter. Third, the interests of the second client must be
materially adverse to the former client's interests. Fourth, the former client
must not have consented to the representation after consultation.99
Rule 1.7,100 which is referenced to by rule 1.9, was used to reach the con-
clusion that the interests of the client were adverse.' 0' The court reasoned
that a "[disqualification of counsel] cannot be accomplished mechanically,
but requires a balance between the goals and objectives of professional con-
duct."'0 2 Consequently, "[tihe Third Circuit has long refused to adopt a per
se rule in questions of disqualification."'' 03
Disqualification of the defendant's law firm was next considered. Rule
1.10 was applied,'0 4 but screening was recognized as an acceptable alternative
to imputed disqualification in the context of rule 1.11.105 Combining this
with the "functional analysis" approach advocated in the comment to rule
1.10,106 the court held that screening, under the proper circumstances, was an
appropriate alternative to imputed disqualification of the entire law firm.
When Delaware adopted the Model Rules, the comments to the rules were
also adopted. The comment to rule 1.10 makes it clear that screening should
not be allowed to shelter the movement of a private attorney. Delaware had
the opportunity, but elected not to adopt the comment to the draft rules that
represents the opposite position.' 7 The court overlooked this fact. Moreover,
98. Nenours Found., 632 F. Supp. at 422.
99. Id. at 423.
100. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983) (Conflicts of Interest: General
Rule) provides in part:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be
directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect
the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents to consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely af-
fected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
101. Id.
102. Nemours Found., 632 F. Supp. at 423 (citing Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d
539, 543 (3d Cir. 1977)).
103. Nemours Found., 632 F. Supp. at 425.
104. Id. at 424.
105. The court acknowledged that the rule was to be used for former government attorneys,
but then ignored this conclusion.
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the following question was neglected. If a rule dealing with government at-
torneys explicitly advocates screening, why does the rule dealing with private
attorneys leave it out? The obvious answer is that screening procedures were
purposely left out. If a rule is put to the court for interpretation, the court
should look to the intent of the body that adopted the rule and interpret the
rule according to its plain language. In Nemours the court ignores the
manifest intent of the framers.
Practical Considerations and Solutions to Imputed Disqualification
The general problem with this area of the law is that the focus has been
shifted from protecting the client to protecting the mobility of lawyers. The
most obvious solution is to avoid the problem. By sifting through a potential
employee's background before hiring, a firm can largely avoid the failure to
discover conflicts of interest. Many larger firms require clerks to fill out ex-
tensive memos once they begin work to determine if any conflicts exist.
When completed, these memos should indicate the firms for which clerks
have worked, what attorneys the clerks have worked with, and the identity of
the clients whose project they have worked on. 08 Perhaps the bar should re-
quire attorneys as well as clerks to keep a record of the clients for whom they
have worked and when. This record could be reviewed by a law firm and any
conflicts could be recognized quickly. This may not reveal all conflicts, but it
will decrease the number that are discovered too late.
Another solution condoned by the Model Rules is to seek the client's
waiver. Law firms could establish screening procedures to discover conflicts
and ask for the client's consent in writing. This consent should be contingent
on the screening procedures being in place and adequate. Although the rules
do not advocate screening procedures, there are no limitations on what
agreements may be made in connection with the consent provision.
Lawyers working together on such problems may be the only practical
solution. The judiciary has demonstrated hostility toward imputed dis-
qualification motions. If an attorney moves for disqualification several
months after the other side has proposed a solution, the judge may refuse to
grant the motion altogether. At this point the firm that made the motion is in
a worse position than it would have been had it agreed to screening. Not only
has the disqualification motion been lost, but the other side is not bound to
screen at all.
The judiciary could also propose a solution. District courts could adopt
local rules whereby all disqualification motions must be made within fifteen
days of the time the conflict is discovered or reasonably should have been
discovered. If the time is allowed to lapse, the failure to make the motion
should act as a bar to any subsequent disqualification motions. A policy such
as this would prevent disqualification motions from being made in order to
gain a tactical advantage. Such a policy would also minimize the inequities
that fall upon the clients.' 9
108. The identity of clients is not confidential information.






One area that has received no discussion by the courts or commentators is
the cost of defending a disqualification motion. The client should not have to
pay for any litigation that is the result of a conflict of interest within the
firm. Costs attributable to a disqualification are a major reason that such
motions are denied. If a law firm is disqualified as a result of one of its at-
torneys having a major conflict of interest problem, why should the client
have to pay another attorney to become familiar with the facts of the case?
This cost should be paid by the law firm. The measure is harsh, but the end
result is that conflict problems will receive more attention at the start of
representation. Even if a law firm does successfully defeat a motion for dis-
qualification, the time spent on that portion of the lawsuit should not be
billed to the client.
It may be argued that this is merely a cost of the client obtaining the
counsel of choice, that if clients want a law firm to represent them, they
should pay extra to keep the law firm as counsel. However, all conflicts that
a law firm may encounter while representing a client can be discovered before
representation has begun or before the conflict occurs. Once a conflict is
recognized a law firm has a duty to refuse employment. If the law firm ac-
cepts the employment with knowledge of a potential conflict or negligently
fails to discover the conflict, the cost of defending against a subsequent dis-
qualification motion should not be billed to the client.
Employees
Another area not frequently discussed is the problem that nonattorney
employees present when changing from one law firm to another. Secretaries
as well as summer clerks could present conflict of interest problems.
Although there is little authority in the area, the law seems to be that liability
for disqualification extends to an attorney's employees and former employees
who have been privy to client communications. ' 0
doubtedly reluctant to disqualify a firm when the result will be additional delays and expenses.
The local rules that are suggested are merely to allow the litigation to continue unhindered by
unnecessary disqualification motions. Even if a court were to adopt the suggested local rules, the
question of whether the law firm might be subject to disciplinary action or malpractice claims
would still be open.
110. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir.
1975) (no basis for distinguishing among partners and associates on title alone); American Can
Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 1971) (disqualification did not extend to
an attorney who was not an employee, but attorney was liable for all employees privy to client
confidences); Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037, 1043 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(that an individual is not an attorney does not make it less likely that confidential information
will be revealed, but more likely). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 786 F.2d 3, 6 (Ist Cir.
1986) (agents or employees do not stand in the attorney's shoes). Cf. Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0
Enter., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 1231, 1238-39 (N.D. I11. 1985) (secretary, a key employee, switched
sides, but attorney proved that no information was shared).
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